Title
Corporate Governance
Keywords
Boards of directors; Organizational crises; Organizational outcomes
Abstract
The separation of ownership from control in modern corporations has led to some interesting questions and much debate among researchers and practicing managers (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Berle and Means, 1932; Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Individual shareholders, unless they are also managers or hold a large block of stock, have very little influence on the company. Managers, as agents for the shareholders, make most important decisions with regard to corporate operations. Stewardship theory suggests that managers should be given maximum liberty to make decisions so that they are not encumbered by rules and influences that can jeopardize optimal performance (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997) However, many researchers and practitioners wonder whether managers can be relied upon to sacrifice their own self-interests and behave in a manner that is in the best interests of the shareholders.
Publication Date
2-26-2008
Publication Title
The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management
Number of Pages
543-564
Document Type
Article; Book Chapter
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/b.9780631218616.2006.00020.x
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
85044961041 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85044961041
STARS Citation
Chatterjee, Sayan and Harrison, Jeffrey S., "Corporate Governance" (2008). Scopus Export 2000s. 10774.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2000/10774