Title

Corporate Governance

Keywords

Boards of directors; Organizational crises; Organizational outcomes

Abstract

The separation of ownership from control in modern corporations has led to some interesting questions and much debate among researchers and practicing managers (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Berle and Means, 1932; Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Individual shareholders, unless they are also managers or hold a large block of stock, have very little influence on the company. Managers, as agents for the shareholders, make most important decisions with regard to corporate operations. Stewardship theory suggests that managers should be given maximum liberty to make decisions so that they are not encumbered by rules and influences that can jeopardize optimal performance (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997) However, many researchers and practitioners wonder whether managers can be relied upon to sacrifice their own self-interests and behave in a manner that is in the best interests of the shareholders.

Publication Date

2-26-2008

Publication Title

The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management

Number of Pages

543-564

Document Type

Article; Book Chapter

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/b.9780631218616.2006.00020.x

Socpus ID

85044961041 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85044961041

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