Title
Underpricing In Public Lotterirs: A Critique Of User-Pay And All-Pay Tarrifs
Abstract
A body of literature spanning from medical ethics to public economics has amassed regarding the rationing of underpriced public resources. This study investigates the effects of price on entry, individual and aggregate expected consumer surplus, and tax revenues in user-pay and all-pay (AP) lotteries. Comparative statics indicate that expected surplus may increase (decrease) as price increases (decreases) if entry is sufficiently responsive though entry in AP lotteries is inelastic at all prices. Further, the lotteries are shown to be outcome equivalent under revenue equivalency. Selected results are evaluated numerically with simulations performed across a broad class of distributions describing individual private values. © 2007 Western Economic Association International.
Publication Date
7-1-2009
Publication Title
Economic Inquiry
Volume
47
Issue
3
Number of Pages
500-511
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00084.x
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
68349150559 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/68349150559
STARS Citation
Scrogin, David, "Underpricing In Public Lotterirs: A Critique Of User-Pay And All-Pay Tarrifs" (2009). Scopus Export 2000s. 11782.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2000/11782