Title

Testing Static Game Theory With Dynamic Experiments: A Case Study Of Public Goods

Keywords

Experiments; Game theory; Public goods

Abstract

Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

1-1-2009

Publication Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

67

Issue

1

Number of Pages

-

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.013

Socpus ID

67651244214 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/67651244214

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