Title

Executive Compensation And Agency Costs In Germany

Keywords

Agency; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Germany

Abstract

With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.© 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

7-1-2003

Publication Title

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volume

27

Issue

7

Number of Pages

1391-1410

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00274-1

Socpus ID

0037677950 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/0037677950

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