Title

Metzinger'S Matrix: Living The Virtual Life With A Real Body

Keywords

Cotard's Syndrome; Disembodiment; Embodiment; Self

Abstract

Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, the self should be considered something real, and not simply an illusion.

Publication Date

10-20-2005

Publication Title

Psyche

Volume

11

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

Socpus ID

26644466128 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/26644466128

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