Title

Incentive Compensation For Bank Directors: The Impact Of Deregulation

Abstract

Although deregulation leads to changes in the duties of boards of directors, little is known about changes in their incentives. U.S. banking deregulation and associated changes during the 1990s lends itself to a natural experiment. These industry shocks forced bank directors to face expanded opportunities, increased competition, and an expanding market for corporate control. While bank directors received significantly less equity-based compensation throughout most of the 1990s, by 1999, their use of such compensation is indistinguishable from a matched sample of industrial firms. Our results suggest firms respond to deregulation by improving internal monitoring through aligning directors' and shareholders' incentives. © 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

9-1-2005

Publication Title

Journal of Business

Volume

78

Issue

5

Number of Pages

1753-1777

Document Type

Review

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/431441

Socpus ID

32144457431 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/32144457431

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