Title
The Best Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-Gley: Judicial Reform In Latin America - Evidence From Costa Rica
Abstract
Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through the 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on economic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors' expectations of the judicial reforms' economic impact and the observed outcomes. © 2004 Cambridge University Press.
Publication Date
8-1-2004
Publication Title
Journal of Latin American Studies
Volume
36
Issue
3 SPEC. ISS.
Number of Pages
507-531
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X04007771
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
4744353793 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/4744353793
STARS Citation
Wilson, Bruce M.; Rodríguez Cordero, Juan Carlos; and Handberg, Roger, "The Best Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-Gley: Judicial Reform In Latin America - Evidence From Costa Rica" (2004). Scopus Export 2000s. 5100.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2000/5100