Title

Neurocognitive Models Of Schizophrenia: A Neurophenomenological Critique

Keywords

Agency; Bottom-up explanations; Delusions of control; Frith's model; Neurophenomenology; Ownership; Schizophrenia; Thought insertion; Top-down explanations

Abstract

This paper argues that Frith's (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms. Copyright © 2004 S. Karger AG, Basel.

Publication Date

3-22-2004

Publication Title

Psychopathology

Volume

37

Issue

1

Number of Pages

8-19

Document Type

Review

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1159/000077014

Socpus ID

1542267734 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/1542267734

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