Title

An Economic Framework For Spectrum Allocation And Service Pricing With Competitive Wireless Service Providers

Abstract

In the future, we can expect to see more dynamic service offerings and profiles, as users move from long-term service provider agreements to more opportunistic service models. Moreover, when the radio spectrum is itself traded in a market-based scenario, wireless service providers (WSPs) will likely require new strategies to deploy services, define service profiles, and price them. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic trading system will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. From an economic point of view, we analyze two main components of this overall trading system: i) spectrum allocation to WSPs and ii) interaction of end users with the WSPs. For this two-tier trading system, we present a winner determining sealed-bid knapsack auction mechanism that dynamically allocates spectrum to the WSPs based on their bids. We propose a dynamic pricing strategy based on game theory to capture the conflict of interest between WSPs and end users, both of whom try to maximize their respective net utilities. We show that even in such a greedy and non-cooperative behavioral game model, it is in the best interest of the WSPs to adhere to a price threshold which is a consequence of a price equilibrium in an oligopoly situation. Through simulation results, we show that the proposed auction entices the WSPs to participate in the auction, makes optimal use of the common spectrum pool, and avoids collusion among WSPs. Moreover, numerical results demonstrate how pricing can be used as an effective tool for providing incentives to the WSPs to upgrade their network resources and offer better services. © 2007 IEEE.

Publication Date

1-1-2007

Publication Title

2007 2nd IEEE International Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

Number of Pages

89-98

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/DYSPAN.2007.19

Socpus ID

34548722827 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/34548722827

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