Title

Income Distribution Preferences And Regulatory Change In Social Dilemmas

Keywords

Income inequality; Regulatory change; Social dilemma; Social preferences

Abstract

We present results from an experiment where we elicit preferences over regulatory policies of social dilemmas for small groups. These policy choices differ only in income distribution and are made after a common group experience of an unregulated social dilemma game. We model two policies: a traditional grandfathering allocation of pollution permits and an egalitarian public trust fund. We find a sizeable fraction of our participants favor the public trust, indicating that social preferences are not sufficiently expressed during the interactive social dilemma game. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

10-1-2006

Publication Title

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volume

61

Issue

2

Number of Pages

181-198

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.012

Socpus ID

33748962578 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/33748962578

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