Title

Agency Hazards And Alliance Portfolios

Keywords

Agency theory; Joint ventures; Ownership structure; Strategic alliances

Abstract

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Publication Title

Strategic Management Journal

Volume

27

Issue

1

Number of Pages

27-43

Document Type

Review

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.446

Socpus ID

29444454178 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/29444454178

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