Title

Enforcing Cooperation In Ad Hoc Networks With Unreliable Channel

Abstract

An inherent assumption for packet forwarding in ad networks is that the nodes will cooperate i.e., can rely in each other. Thus, it is extremely that cooperation is induced and achieved the network. In this paper, we use game theory analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions tocooperation enforced, especially when a node perfectly monitor other nodes' behaviors. We a credit exchange method under a general unreliable and show that the packet forwarding can be adjusted through proper design of, which in turn can be used to attain the Nash Equilibrium. We extend our discussion epeated games and take several well-known strategy and derive the conditions under which cooperation can lead to a subgame perfect Nash. In particular, we show how the unreliable can affect the conditions and how a reputation trategy leads to subgame perfection even under monitoring. We further investigate collusion and cooperation coalition formation using game theory. Mathematical proofs show existence of an upper bound on the population of the non-cooperative nodes for an evolutionarily stable strategy that enforces full cooperation. bound is shown to depend on the nodes' belief on continuity of the game. ©2008 IEEE.

Publication Date

12-1-2008

Publication Title

2008 5th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2008

Number of Pages

456-462

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/MAHSS.2008.4660013

Socpus ID

67650661144 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/67650661144

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