Title

Voting Games And Computational Complexity

Abstract

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is 'difficult' to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others' preferences. © Oxford University Press 2008 All rights reserved.

Publication Date

7-1-2008

Publication Title

Oxford Economic Papers

Volume

60

Issue

3

Number of Pages

546-565

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpm045

Socpus ID

47049092481 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/47049092481

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