Title

Does Regulation Substitute Or Complement Governance?

Keywords

Corporate governance; G21; G22; G28; G34; IPO; Regulation

Abstract

We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and increased monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if regulation substitutes for governance. Using data from initial public offerings, we document that regulated firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors and larger boards as well as use similar amounts of equity-based compensation as non-regulated firms. Further, regulated and unregulated firms are analogous in terms of observed trade-offs between traditional monitoring mechanisms and insider ownership. Finally, regulated firms appear to decrease monitoring following a period of deregulation. These findings support the hypothesis that regulation and governance are complements and are consistent with the notion that regulators pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring structures. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

Publication Date

3-1-2011

Publication Title

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volume

35

Issue

3

Number of Pages

736-751

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.003

Socpus ID

78651418529 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/78651418529

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