Title

Defining Consciousness : The Importance Of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness

Keywords

Blindsight; Consciousness; Higher-order theories; Intentionality; Nonreflective self-awareness; Phenomenality

Abstract

I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes. © John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Publication Date

12-1-2010

Publication Title

Pragmatics and Cognition

Volume

18

Issue

3

Number of Pages

561-569

Document Type

Review

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.18.3.04gal

Socpus ID

79953681327 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/79953681327

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