Title

Divisible Good Auctions With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

Abstract

An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior. Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2013.

Publication Date

8-1-2013

Publication Title

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Volume

48

Issue

4

Number of Pages

1271-1300

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109013000409

Socpus ID

84891548358 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84891548358

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