Title

The Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics Of Locally Differentiable Feedback Nash Equilibria Of Autonomous And Exponentially Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

Keywords

Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Nash equilibria

Abstract

The comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. The resulting refutable implications are intrinsic to the said class of differential games, and thus form their basic, empirically testable, properties. Their relationship with extant results in the optimal control theory and the static game theory is discussed. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics collapse, in form, to those in optimal control problems. Applications of the results to capital accumulation and sticky-price games are provided. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Publication Date

10-1-2013

Publication Title

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volume

37

Issue

10

Number of Pages

1982-1994

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.05.008

Socpus ID

84880697180 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84880697180

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