Title
Earnings Management And Annual General Meetings: The Role Of Managerial Entrenchment
Keywords
Annual general meeting; Earnings management; Managerial entrenchment; Shareholder proposals
Abstract
We examine earnings management around the annual general meeting (AGM) and assess the influence of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with prior research, we show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding AGMs regardless of the level of managerial entrenchment. We find evidence of significant earnings manipulation primarily among entrenched managers. Specifically, they manage abnormal accruals downward two quarters prior to the AGM and significantly increase abnormal accruals in the quarter immediately before the AGM. Our evidence is consistent with AGMs triggering managers to disseminate information in a manner that shapes the market's perception of the firm. © 2013, The Eastern Finance Association.
Publication Date
5-1-2013
Publication Title
Financial Review
Volume
48
Issue
2
Number of Pages
259-282
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12003
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84875823895 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84875823895
STARS Citation
Banko, John; Frye, Melissa B.; Wang, Weishen; and Whyte, Ann Marie, "Earnings Management And Annual General Meetings: The Role Of Managerial Entrenchment" (2013). Scopus Export 2010-2014. 6911.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2010/6911