Title

Rance, Brossard Mopin, And Manchukuo

Abstract

In September 1931, the Japanese colonial army in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, began operations to take over Manchuria, the northeastern provinces of China. The Kwantung Army long had exercised strong influence over Zhang Zuolin, a regional military authority based in Shenyang, but had grown dissatisfied with his failure to cooperate completely and his military adventurism in North China. In June 1928, Zhang, defeated by Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang Army, returned to Shenyang from a failed attempt to control Beijing. As his train approached Shenyang, a group of Kwantung Army officers exploded a bomb, destroying his railcar and assassinating him. Zhang's son, Zhang Xueliang, succeeded him, but instead of being the weak and pliable leader the Kwantung Army expected, he allied with the Guomindang and attempted to reduce Japanese influence. In 1931, a group of Kwantung Army officers, seeing Zhang as a fundamental threat to Japanese interests, decided it was necessary to control Manchuria directly. On September 18, they staged another bombing and used it as an excuse to attack Chinese troops in Manchuria. Within a few months, the Kwantung Army had seized a substantial part of Manchuria, and had decided to install a new regime. Rather than allow a new warlord to take power, the army encouraged the formation of an autonomy movement, headed by local Chinese officials, that would endorse the formation of a new state. On March 1, 1932, the committee declared that Manchuria was independent of the Republic of China and the Guomindang regime, and announced the establishment of a new nation, Manchukuo. Making use of the research bureau and other resources of the Japanese colonial railway company, the South Manchuria Railway, the Kwantung Army quickly began an economic and political transformation of the region. Japan was a signatory of the 1922 Nine Powers Treaty that guaranteed the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The Kwantung Army's seizure of Manchuria could easily be seen as a violation of this treaty, and well as of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand, in which the signatories, including Japan, renounced "war as an instrument of national policy." The Kwantung Army countered that it acted only in support of the wishes for good government of the people of Manchuria who had established Manchukuo of their own volition. The new state of Manchukuo and its institutions then served to extend the Kwantung Army's control over Manchuria, as a vehicle to develop the region's resources, and as a means to deflect international criticism and to channel that criticism into acceptance or even support. The Great Powers and the League of Nations might object to Japanese rule of Manchuria, but presenting that control in the form of an independent state, Manchukuo, gave them a potentially face-saving fiction much easier to accept. Even if the United States or Britain did not extend diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo, they might find themselves entangled in dealing with its institutions. The Japanese and Manchukuo governments made considerable effort to draw out acknowledgements of Manchukuo's existence in ways used for similar ends later in the twentieth century, such as sports diplomacy,1 tourism, contests, expositions, and world's fairs.2 Even if full diplomatic recognition were not achieved, it was worthwhile to keep the Great Powers engaged in extended negotiations and disputes, be it over the most trivial matters. Investment and trade were particularly important areas in which to attract foreign acknowledgement and co-operation. They could appeal, during the bad economic years of the 1930s, to governments anxious about their own economies, or to interests that could pressure those governments to relax their anti-Manchukuo stances. Rumors of possible opportunities and deals made by rivals could attract and hold interest, negotiations could be extended for months and years, and one group could be played off against another-all providing reasons to keep open the possibilities of recognition of Manchukuo and acceptance of the occupation. Foreign investment and trade also could supplement scarce Japanese capital for Manchuria's development. The Kwantung Army's plans for Manchukuo were highly ambitious and elaborate, but the army faced financial and resource constraints. On the other hand, some Japanese held that Manchukuo's development was a matter of Japanese pride, an accomplishment that should not be diluted by foreign interference, or that Manchuria's iron, coal, and other resources should be controlled completely by Japan for Japanese and Manchukuoan national security and development. This lack of unity complicated some negotiations with foreign investors. It required considerable wooing to gain acceptance even from some sympathetic nations. Japan made extensive efforts to attain German recognition of Manchukuo, but did not achieve success until May 12, 1938. Despite considerable sympathy with Japan, Germany had large economic interests in the Republic of China-which played a major role in the global supply of the strategic materials antimony and tungsten- And gave military aid to the Chinese government. Manchurian soy oil was also an important German import, and the Manchukuo government consistently tried to expand commercial relations. A 1935 German economic mission to Manchukuo preceded a Manchukuo-German trade agreement in 1936, which the Manchukuo government claimed provided de facto recognition by Germany. Despite the November 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, it still took another two years of effort to achieve formal German recognition of Manchukuo. Manchukuo gained Italian recognition on November 20, 1937 through a similar process of encouraging trade. Britain and the United States were, along with China, centers of determined opposition to Manchukuo, but even they were not immune to the temptations of commerce. Official British disapproval of Manchukuo did not stop British businesses from pursuing opportunities in Manchukuo. In October 1934, the Federation of British Industries (FBI) sent what it described as a "non-political" trade mission to Manchukuo. Its subsequent report praised Manchukuo's accomplishments and offered "the collaboration of British industry in the development of that State." The report argued that the best "opportunity for stimulating the sale of British products" would be found "in British participation in the development work" of Manchukuo. The Manchukuo government, even several years later, maintained that the FBI report had "rectified the errors of the Lytton Commission." This League of Nations commission, headed by the Earl of Lytton, a British former colonial administrator, issued a report that countered Japanese claims about the Manchurian Incident, and became an important support of the non-recognition of Manchukuo by the League and by the Great Powers. Indeed, Japan withdrew from the League in objection to it. So, Manchukuo was able to use the British Federation of Industry against the British-led Lytton Commission. Furthermore, the Manchukuo government pointed out that the FBI report had discussed the "enhancement of friendly relations" between Britain and Manchukuo. Indeed, a British parlimentary question asked if recognition of Manchukuo were necessary to gain access to its market. The response was that market access could be gained without de jure recognition, through British consular representatives in Manchuria who were accredited to the Republic of China. Since any trade negotiations in Manchuria would be conducted with Japanese and Manchukuo representatives, this answer indicated the British government's apparent willingness to deal with Manchukuo for commercial benefit. Again, the promise of trade helped to keep open the possibility of British formal recognition. There were also ongoing efforts to interest the United States in trade and investment in Manchukuo. American government and business for decades had looked to Manchuria as a valuable market, and were interested in maintaining and, if possible, expanding access to it. From the beginning of the Japanese army's occupation of Manchuria, the US government was concerned that the open door of equal commercial access might close. It agreed with the Lytton Commission report which said that it was "essential" to maintain the principle of the Open Door in trade, industry, and banking, and worried that "Japanese business concerns" might take advantage of their hegemony in Manchuria.

Publication Date

1-1-2013

Publication Title

Harbin to Hanoi: The Colonial Built Environment in Asia, 1840 to 1940

Volume

9789882203891

Number of Pages

59-81

Document Type

Article; Book Chapter

Personal Identifier

scopus

Socpus ID

84903161310 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84903161310

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