Title

Kierkegaard And The Phenomenology Of Selfhood

Abstract

In this paper I first examine the claim that the phenomenological tradition unanimously affirms that the core self is to be found in pre-reflective consciousness. I argue that the notion of the minimal self as first-person subjective givenness is problematic in important ways. Then, following the recent attention given to Kierkegaard as phenomenologist, I ask how Kierkegaard relates to the phenomenology of selfhood. Rather than proceeding directly, however, I argue that we must first consider Kierkegaard's phenomenology of love before we can consider what we might call his phenomenology of selfhood, for the former holds crucial implications for the latter.

Publication Date

1-1-2014

Publication Title

International Philosophical Quarterly

Volume

54

Issue

1

Number of Pages

59-74

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq20141235

Socpus ID

84905217624 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84905217624

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS