Real Estate Agents, House Prices, And Liquidity

Keywords

House prices; Liquidity; Moral hazard; Real estate agents

Abstract

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.

Publication Date

1-1-2015

Publication Title

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

Volume

50

Issue

1

Number of Pages

1-33

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9452-x

Socpus ID

84891394634 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84891394634

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