Title
Real Estate Agents, House Prices, And Liquidity
Keywords
House prices; Liquidity; Moral hazard; Real estate agents
Abstract
Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.
Publication Date
1-1-2015
Publication Title
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Volume
50
Issue
1
Number of Pages
1-33
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-013-9452-x
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84891394634 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84891394634
STARS Citation
Munneke, Henry J.; Ooi, Joseph T.L.; Sirmans, C. F.; and Turnbull, Geoffrey K., "Real Estate Agents, House Prices, And Liquidity" (2015). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 1.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/1