Game Theoretical Designs Of Resilient Cooperative Systems
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing a resilient cooperative system from the perspective of differential game theory, as the conflict between a defender (i.e., the system's control designer) and any potential attacker. Intuitively, a resilient system is one in which the defender is a superior player to any potential adversary. It is shown that, for cooperative networked systems that have a multi-layer information structure, the defender is superior to the attacker if the defender has a superior information structure in that it has access to more layers of information than those accessible to the attacker. This insight reveals that the networked consensus dynamics can be made resilient against attacks by introducing a hidden-layer network interconnected to the original consensus network but shielded from the attacker. Nash equilibrium and Lyapunov analysis are used to demonstrate resilience under all adversary strategies. Several scenarios are used to illustrate the proposed concepts and designs.
Publication Date
11-16-2015
Publication Title
2015 European Control Conference, ECC 2015
Number of Pages
1705-1711
Document Type
Article; Proceedings Paper
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1109/ECC.2015.7330783
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84963865160 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84963865160
STARS Citation
Gusrialdi, Azwirman; Qu, Zhihua; and Simaan, Marwan A., "Game Theoretical Designs Of Resilient Cooperative Systems" (2015). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 1838.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/1838