Intrinsic Comparative Statics Of A Nash Bargaining Solution

Keywords

comparative statics; disagreement point; Nash bargaining solution

Abstract

A generalization of the class of bargaining problems examined by Engwerda and Douven [(2008) On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution, Int. J. Game Theory 37, 265-279] is studied. The generalized class consists of nonconvex bargaining problems in which the feasible set satisfies the requirement that the set of weak Pareto-optimal solutions can be described by a smooth function. The intrinsic comparative statics of the aforesaid class are derived and shown to be characterized by a symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, and an upper bound to the rank of the matrix is established. A corollary to this basic result is that a Nash bargaining solution is intrinsically a locally nondecreasing function of its own disagreement point. Other heretofore unknown results are similarly deduced from the basic result.

Publication Date

12-1-2016

Publication Title

International Game Theory Review

Volume

18

Issue

4

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916500134

Socpus ID

84990190117 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84990190117

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