Intrinsic Comparative Dynamics Of Locally Differentiable Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria

Keywords

Comparative dynamics; Differential games; Feedback Stackelberg equilibria

Abstract

The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Stackelberg equilibria are derived for the ubiquitous class of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games. It is shown that the follower’s intrinsic comparative dynamics agree in their form and qualitative properties with those of every player in a feedback Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ in form. The difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader-follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which the intrinsic comparative dynamics of feedback Nash equilibria, feedback Stackelberg equilibria, and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical.

Publication Date

3-1-2015

Publication Title

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volume

5

Issue

1

Number of Pages

1-25

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0121-3

Socpus ID

84923348513 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84923348513

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS