The Moral Foreign-Language Effect

Keywords

Dual-Process Theory; Foreign-Language Effect; Moral Judgment; Moral Psychology

Abstract

Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect (FLE) is the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language. We demonstrate that the FLE extends to moral judgment. This indicates that different types of processes can lead to the formation of differing moral judgments. One implication of the FLE is that it raises the possibility that moral judgments can be made more systematic, and that the type of processing used to form them might be relevant to normative and applied ethics.

Publication Date

1-2-2016

Publication Title

Philosophical Psychology

Volume

29

Issue

1

Number of Pages

23-40

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.993063

Socpus ID

84955598530 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84955598530

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