Nash Strategies For Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games Involving Limited Observations
Abstract
A linear-quadratic N-pursuer single-evader differential game is considered. The evader can observe all the pursuers but pursuers have limited observations of themselves and the evader. The evader implements the conventional feedback Nash strategy and the pursuers implement Nash strategies based on a novel concept of best achievable performance indices. This problem has potential applications in situations where a well-equipped unmanned vehicle is evading several weakly equipped pursuing vehicles. An illustrative example is solved, and several scenarios are presented.
Publication Date
4-1-2015
Publication Title
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Volume
51
Issue
2
Number of Pages
1347-1356
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1109/TAES.2014.130569
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84934324725 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84934324725
STARS Citation
Lin, Wei; Qu, Zhihua; and Simaan, Marwan A., "Nash Strategies For Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games Involving Limited Observations" (2015). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 312.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/312