Nash Strategies For Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games Involving Limited Observations

Abstract

A linear-quadratic N-pursuer single-evader differential game is considered. The evader can observe all the pursuers but pursuers have limited observations of themselves and the evader. The evader implements the conventional feedback Nash strategy and the pursuers implement Nash strategies based on a novel concept of best achievable performance indices. This problem has potential applications in situations where a well-equipped unmanned vehicle is evading several weakly equipped pursuing vehicles. An illustrative example is solved, and several scenarios are presented.

Publication Date

4-1-2015

Publication Title

IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems

Volume

51

Issue

2

Number of Pages

1347-1356

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/TAES.2014.130569

Socpus ID

84934324725 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84934324725

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