Client Externality Effects Of Agents Selling Their Own Properties
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Principal/Agent conflict
Abstract
This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents’ efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.
Publication Date
2-1-2017
Publication Title
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Volume
54
Issue
2
Number of Pages
139-164
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-015-9543-y
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84950235562 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84950235562
STARS Citation
Bian, Xun; Turnbull, Geoffrey K.; and Waller, Bennie D., "Client Externality Effects Of Agents Selling Their Own Properties" (2017). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 5234.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/5234