Institutional Control Of Redistricting And The Geography Of Representation

Abstract

A number of states have empowered independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) to redraw legislative districts each decade following the US Census. Reformers see IRCs, which have binding authority and political independence, as a solution to the practice of gerrymandering and have proposed using them throughout the United States. With less incentive to protect incumbents, do IRCs adhere more closely to traditional redistricting principles, such as drawing compact districts, maintaining continuity, and respecting political subdivisions? We examine a large sample of congressional and state legislative districts and find that, relative to legislatures, IRCs tend to draw more compact districts, split fewer political subdivisions, and may also do a better job of preserving the population cores of prior districts.

Publication Date

4-1-2017

Publication Title

Journal of Politics

Volume

79

Issue

2

Number of Pages

722-726

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/690633

Socpus ID

85017367016 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85017367016

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