How Secure Is Split Manufacturing In Preventing Hardware Trojan?

Abstract

With the trend of outsourcing fabrication, split manufacturing is regarded as a promising way to both provide the high-end nodes in untrusted external foundries and protect the design from potential attackers. However, in this work, we show that split manufacturing is not inherently secure. A hardware trojan attacker can still discover necessary information with a simulated annealing based attack approach at the placement level. We further propose a defense approach by moving the insecure gates away from their easily-attacked candidate locations. Experimental results on benchmark circuits show the effectiveness of our proposed methods.

Publication Date

1-26-2017

Publication Title

Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium, AsianHOST 2016

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835561

Socpus ID

85015199518 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85015199518

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