Approximate Power Grid Protection Against False Data Injection Attacks

Keywords

Fault Data Injection; Power Grid Security

Abstract

A family of new attacks have been found against power grid systems recently which are capable of affecting power grids without being detectable via conventional means. Though powerful, the attacks rely on the attacker having complete knowledge of the power grid system. This work will evaluate the power grid resiliency countering such attacks when an attacker does not have such complete knowledge. More specifically, this paper examines the rerouting that already commonly occurs in power systems as an inherent defense against this particular class of attacks by increasing the power grid topology complexity. An algorithm is developed to calculate the probability of a successful attack given a particular topology and configuration of circuit breakers. The experimental results demonstrate that the existence of defense circuit breakers in a power grid system can lead to substantial improvements in security.

Publication Date

3-29-2018

Publication Title

Proceedings - 2017 IEEE 15th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, 2017 IEEE 15th International Conference on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, 2017 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Big Data Intelligence and Computing and 2017 IEEE Cyber Science and Technology Congress, DASC-PICom-DataCom-CyberSciTec 2017

Volume

2018-January

Number of Pages

1-7

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC-PICom-DataCom-CyberSciTec.2017.97

Socpus ID

85048085447 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85048085447

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