Equilibrium Informativeness In Veto Games
Keywords
Cheap talk; Non-compliance; Physician-induced demand; Veto
Abstract
In a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option. The arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions, corporations, and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection. We develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work. We show that Krishna and Morgan's (2001) equilibrium is maximally informative and strengthen Dessein's (2002) comparison of full delegation and veto. In an application we study the relationship between a patient and a doctor with a financial incentive to overtreat, and show that the doctor's bias harms the patient both through excessive treatment and information loss, that the latter can be substantial, and that insurance benefits both parties by improving communication.
Publication Date
5-1-2018
Publication Title
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
109
Number of Pages
104-125
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.010
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
85044394225 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85044394225
STARS Citation
Lubensky, Dmitry and Schmidbauer, Eric, "Equilibrium Informativeness In Veto Games" (2018). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 8517.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/8517