Non-Cooperative Optimization Of Charging Scheduling Of Electric Vehicle Via Stackelberg Game

Keywords

Charging scheduling; Electric vehicle; Stackelberg game

Abstract

In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.

Publication Date

10-15-2018

Publication Title

2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018

Number of Pages

1658-1663

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Socpus ID

85056739649 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85056739649

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