Non-Cooperative Optimization Of Charging Scheduling Of Electric Vehicle Via Stackelberg Game
Keywords
Charging scheduling; Electric vehicle; Stackelberg game
Abstract
In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.
Publication Date
10-15-2018
Publication Title
2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
Number of Pages
1658-1663
Document Type
Article; Proceedings Paper
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
85056739649 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85056739649
STARS Citation
Yoshihara, Miyu; Namerikawa, Toru; and Qu, Zhihua, "Non-Cooperative Optimization Of Charging Scheduling Of Electric Vehicle Via Stackelberg Game" (2018). Scopus Export 2015-2019. 8964.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2015/8964