Demanding The Impossible: War, Bargaining, And Honor

Abstract

This article shows that honor concerns can influence war initiation and termination decisions. When bargaining implicates status or commitments to in-group members, moral nationalists may experience dishonor—and with it emotions like shame and humiliation—when they have to make concessions. These honor costs are different from other costs because they can sometimes be vindicated through costly action. Including these costs in a basic, complete information bargaining model demonstrates that honor concerns can give rise to a “fight, then agree” equilibrium. These influences of honor on war initiation and termination are illustrated with case studies of British decisions in the 1982 Falklands War and French decisions during the 1940 invasion of France.

Publication Date

7-3-2015

Publication Title

Security Studies

Volume

24

Issue

3

Number of Pages

528-562

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1070622

Socpus ID

84942082437 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84942082437

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