Abstract

This thesis argues that the different reactions of the population and rival elites to executive attempts to extend term limits in Rwanda and Burundi reflect the different ways civil wars ended in these two countries. In Rwanda, a military victory resulted in institutions that placed less constraint on the ruling party, while in Burundi, a negotiated settlement placed comparatively greater constraints on the ruling party. As a result, the major party in Rwanda was more powerful than the major power in Burundi, and thus more capable to co-opt or coerce the opposition. This paper uses a most-similar case design to test the hypothesis that civil wars that end in negotiated settlements are more likely to become unstable than a civil war that ends in a military victory when executives attempt to extend their term limits and finds that the civil war outcome was instrumental in explaining the divergent reactions in both countries. This paper has important implications for those interested in post-conflict situations and executive term-limit extensions.

Thesis Completion

2017

Semester

Fall

Thesis Chair

Powell, Jonathan

Degree

Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)

College

College of Sciences

Department

Political Science

Degree Program

Political Science

Location

Orlando (Main) Campus

Language

English

Access Status

Campus Access

Length of Campus-only Access

1 year

Release Date

11-28-2017

Share

COinS