Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

    Authors

    A. Botelho; G. W. Harrison; L. M. C. Pinto;E. E. Rutstrom

    Comments

    Authors: contact us about adding a copy of your work at STARS@ucf.edu

    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Games Econ. Behav.

    Keywords

    Game theory; Experiments; Public goods; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS; FREE-RIDE; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; STRATEGIES; ALTRUISM; NOISE; Economics

    Abstract

    Game theory Provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters Usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Games and Economic Behavior

    Volume

    67

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2009

    Document Type

    Article; Proceedings Paper

    Language

    English

    First Page

    253

    Last Page

    265

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000269433100015

    ISSN

    0899-8256

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