Title

Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

Authors

Authors

A. Botelho; G. W. Harrison; L. M. C. Pinto;E. E. Rutstrom

Comments

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Abbreviated Journal Title

Games Econ. Behav.

Keywords

Game theory; Experiments; Public goods; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS; FREE-RIDE; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; STRATEGIES; ALTRUISM; NOISE; Economics

Abstract

Game theory Provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters Usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Journal Title

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

67

Issue/Number

1

Publication Date

1-1-2009

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Language

English

First Page

253

Last Page

265

WOS Identifier

WOS:000269433100015

ISSN

0899-8256

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