Normativity is the mother of intention: Wittgenstein, normative practices and neurological representations

    Authors

    M. Cash

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    New Ideas Psychol.

    Keywords

    Intention; Normativity; Representation; Neuroscience; Cognitive; psychology; MIND; GESTURES; CHILD; Psychology, Multidisciplinary; Psychology, Experimental

    Abstract

    To many philosophers, a scientific explanation of our contentful intentional states requires us to identify neurological representations that implement intentional states, and requires a reductive explanation of such representations' contents in terms of objective physical properties. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, contentful intentional states are normatively constituted within linguistic, social practices. These cannot be completely accounted for ill Purely physical terms. I outline this normative thesis, defending it from four objections: that it is not naturalistic, that social norms depend oil optional desires to conform, that it over-intellectualizes having intentional states (so excludes animals and infants), and that it cannot account for the causal role of content. I explain the ramifications for scientific psychology and neuroscience, and for interpreting the results of such empirical research. Nothing is objectively a contentful representation, yet some brain states or processes can be normatively constituted as representations with content. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    New Ideas in Psychology

    Volume

    27

    Issue/Number

    2

    Publication Date

    1-1-2009

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    133

    Last Page

    147

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000265157400003

    ISSN

    0732-118X

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