Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Philos. Explor.

    Keywords

    interaction theory; simulation; folk psychology; primary; intersubjectivity; enactive perception; POINT-LIGHT DISPLAYS; MIRROR NEURONS; GAZE SHIFTS; PERCEPTION; SIMULATION; INFANTS; RECOGNITION; INTENTIONS; EMOTION; OTHERS; Philosophy

    Abstract

    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue to operate as our ordinary and everyday basis for social cognition. I also argue that enactive perception rather than implicit simulation is the best model for explaining these capacities.

    Journal Title

    Philosophical Explorations

    Volume

    11

    Issue/Number

    3

    Publication Date

    1-1-2008

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    163

    Last Page

    174

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000263140200002

    ISSN

    1386-9795

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