Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: A neurophenomenological critique

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Psychopathology

    Keywords

    schizophrenia; Frith's model; delusions of control; thought insertion; agency; ownership; top-down explanations; bottom-up explanations; neurophenomenology; SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS; BRAIN POTENTIALS; AWARENESS; PET; PERCEPTION; SIMULATION; THINKING; AGENCY; Psychiatry

    Abstract

    This paper argues that Frith's (1992) account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia in terms of a disruption of metarepresentational self-monitoring is inadequate in several specific ways. More generally, this paper argues against top-down explanations for the loss of the sense of agency in such symptoms. In addition, even if delusions of control might be explained by problems involved in motor control mechanisms involving efference copy and comparators, there are good reasons why the same model cannot explain thought insertion. In place of such neurocognitive explanations, the author develops a neurophenomenological explanation for the loss of the sense of agency and the misattribution of actions and thoughts to others in such symptoms.

    Journal Title

    Psychopathology

    Volume

    37

    Issue/Number

    1

    Publication Date

    1-1-2004

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    8

    Last Page

    19

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000220083500002

    ISSN

    0254-4962

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