Simulation trouble

    Authors

    S. Gallagher

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Soc. Neurosci.

    Keywords

    SHARED MANIFOLD HYPOTHESIS; FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; SELF-AWARENESS; MIRROR; NEURONS; RECOGNITION; INTENTIONS; EMPATHY; MIND; Neurosciences; Psychology

    Abstract

    I present arguments against both explicit and implicit versions of the simulation theory for intersubjective understanding. Logical, developmental, and phenomenological evidence counts against the concept of explicit simulation if this is to be understood as the pervasive or default way that we understand others. The concept of implicit (subpersonal) simulation, identified with neural resonance systems (mirror systems or shared representations), fails to be the kind of simulation required by simulation theory, because it fails to explain how neuronal processes meet constraints that involve instrumentality and pretense. Implicit simulation theory also fails to explain how I can attribute a mental or emotion state that is different from my own to another person. I also provide a brief indication of an alternative interpretation of neural resonance systems.

    Journal Title

    Social Neuroscience

    Volume

    2

    Issue/Number

    3-4

    Publication Date

    1-1-2007

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    353

    Last Page

    365

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000252245400013

    ISSN

    1747-0919

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