Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

    Authors

    K. Madani;A. Dinar

    Comments

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    Abbreviated Journal Title

    Ecol. Econ.

    Keywords

    Common pool resources management; Groundwater; Non-cooperative; Institutions; Modeling; Optimization; REGULATING WATER QUANTITY; ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY; ECOLOGICAL; SUSTAINABILITY; IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; GAME; EXTRACTION; COOPERATION; COMPETITION; GOVERNANCE; Ecology; Economics; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies

    Abstract

    As demands for limited natural resources increase, developing management institutions that ensure the sustainability of such resources is essential. Many natural resources are Common Pool Resources (CPRs), managed under different non-cooperative, cooperative, and externally imposed management frameworks. While early studies of non-cooperative CPR management suggest inevitable "tragedy of the commons," here we discuss how users can avoid tragic outcomes by changing their decision making rationales and exploitation strategies even in a noncooperative environment. This paper introduces and compares various types of non-cooperative institutions that are available to manage CPRs. These management institutions are then applied, using a numerical groundwater exploitation example, to determine how different planning variables are affected by the choice of management institution. Results indicate that CPR users can improve their gains by considering the externalities and developing long-term exploitation plans, as opposed to short-term plans with no consideration of externalities that result in rapid exhaustion of the resource and lead to the so-called "tragedy of the commons." (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Journal Title

    Ecological Economics

    Volume

    74

    Publication Date

    1-1-2012

    Document Type

    Article

    Language

    English

    First Page

    34

    Last Page

    45

    WOS Identifier

    WOS:000301277000006

    ISSN

    0921-8009

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