Abstract

The internationally recognized and flagship worker cooperative Fagor Electrodomésticos was founded in 1956 and was heralded as a success story before declaring bankruptcy in 2013. In this thesis, I examine the existing literature regarding worker cooperatives and provide historical background on Fagor Electrodomésticos. I then focus on one of the factors credited by the literature as contributing to its failure and other worker cooperatives broadly, the internal decision-making process. To analyze the role of the internal decision-making process I develop a game-theoretic model that sheds light on the dynamics of this process. This model contains three actors each of whom attempt to maximize their payoffs by advocating within a three-node game tree. This approach illustrates that in times of economic downturn actors with higher preferences for labor over profit will forestall employment cuts that are required for the firm to remain profitable or break-even and might operate at a loss to avoid necessary employment reductions. I then introduce costs when one or more actors employ their vetoes in a way that can prevent the delay of necessary unemployment reductions for firm survival.

Thesis Completion

2022

Semester

Spring

Thesis Chair

Hamman, Kerstine

Degree

Bachelor of Science (B.S.)

College

College of Sciences

Department

Politics, Security, and International Affairs

Degree Program

Political Science; Economics

Language

English

Access Status

Open Access

Release Date

5-1-2022

Restricted to the UCF community until 5-1-2022; it will then be open access.

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