Abstract

The way we understand community fundamentally structures the way we approach justice. In opposition to totalizing structures of justice founded upon an ontological conception of community, Emmanuel Levinas conceives the possibility of a political or social structure of difference. I argue that the conceptions of community presented by Kant and Heidegger, either as a harmonious, unified being in common, or as a common-identity disclosed beneath the ontological horizon of being-with, necessarily leads to violence. This violence is reflected in the forms of justice instantiated by these philosophies, which privilege the ‘light’ of the universal over the particularity of individuals in the face-to-face encounter, ultimately corrupting and nullifying one’s anarchic moral responsibility for the Other. The intent of this thesis is to argue that justice can only remain just if it is seen, not on the basis of a communal ‘light’ that absorbs, integrates, and incorporates the Other as an element of a system, but as founded on the anarchic responsibility of the one-for-the-Other. Justice, I will show, cannot be seen as an aim of a community—complete and self-sufficient—in achieving an end, but as a rupture, a disturbance, as a call made among a multitude of particular, unique Others by which ethics (the face-to-face) is fundamental.

Notes

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Thesis Completion

2014

Semester

Spring

Advisor

Janz, Bruce B.

Degree

Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)

College

College of Arts and Humanities

Department

Philosophy

Subjects

Arts and Humanities -- Dissertations, Academic; Dissertations, Academic -- Arts and Humanities

Format

PDF

Identifier

CFH0004630

Language

English

Access Status

Open Access

Length of Campus-only Access

3 years

Document Type

Honors in the Major Thesis

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