What's Really Keeping the US from Joining the Kyoto Protocol. A Game Theoretic Empirical Analysis.
Abstract
Policy issues that have global consequences, such as climate change, require countries to interact. Negotiations involv~ng multiple nations can be quite complex and the process creates a number of interesting questions regarding the costs and benefits, as well as the possible conflicts which emerge. Currently the United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, but has not ratified its signature on the Kyoto protocol. This means the US is not subject to reducing its emissions along with the rest of the industrialized countries in the abatement coalition, and thus has no international accountability to cut back its emissions.
This research investigates possible results of negotiated and non-negotiated outcomes of global CO2 abatement mechanisms, particularly focusing on the roles of the United States, China and India. Specifically, the problem investigated sheds light on what incentive China and India provide the United States for signing the Kyoto protocol. A state of the art computable general equilibrium model was used for all simulations and results are consistent with recent action by the United States. Results show the welfare gains to China and India are not enough to offset the welfare loss to the US for joining the abatement coalition, but the gains to other OECD countries do in fact provide enough incentive to convince the United States.
Notes
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Thesis Completion
2006
Semester
Spring
Advisor
Rutstrom, Elisabeth
Degree
Bachelor of Science (B.S.)
College
College of Business Administration
Degree Program
Business Economics
Subjects
Business Administration -- Dissertations, Academic; Dissertations, Academic -- Business Administration; Global warming -- Government policy -- Economic aspects -- United States; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change -- (1992) -- Protocols, etc. -- 1997 Dec. 11
Format
Identifier
DP0022102
Language
English
Access Status
Open Access
Length of Campus-only Access
None
Document Type
Honors in the Major Thesis
Recommended Citation
Schmidt, Robert, "What's Really Keeping the US from Joining the Kyoto Protocol. A Game Theoretic Empirical Analysis." (2006). HIM 1990-2015. 555.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/555