Title
Preference Learning In Consecutive Experimental Auctions
Keywords
Experimental auctions; Preference learning; Price premia
Abstract
This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning - bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations. Copyright 2000 American Agricultural Economics Association.
Publication Date
1-1-2000
Publication Title
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Volume
82
Issue
4
Number of Pages
1016-1021
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/0002-9092.00099
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
0009412810 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/0009412810
STARS Citation
Shogren, Jason F.; List, John A.; and Hayes, Dermot J., "Preference Learning In Consecutive Experimental Auctions" (2000). Scopus Export 2000s. 1301.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2000/1301