Title

Equity And Adverse Selection With Correlated Costs

Keywords

Adverse selection; Agency; Correlated information; Fairness; Inequity

Abstract

We show that agent concern with inequity is not constraining for a principal when the binary costs of two risk neutral agents are correlated. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

6-1-2007

Publication Title

Economics Letters

Volume

95

Issue

3

Number of Pages

402-407

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.015

Socpus ID

34249011256 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/34249011256

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