Title

Equity And Adverse Selection

Abstract

We introduce concerns with inequity into the canonical adverse selection model. We find that aversion to ex post inequity is not constraining for the principal if the two agents are identical ex ante, but generally is constraining when the agents differ ex ante. Constraining equity concerns can lead to output levels that are either above or below standard levels, and can result in only one agent experiencing systematic inequity in equilibrium. © 2007 Blackwell Publishing.

Publication Date

6-1-2007

Publication Title

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volume

16

Issue

2

Number of Pages

285-318

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00140.x

Socpus ID

34248577429 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/34248577429

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS