Title

Policy Making And Rent-Dissipation: An Experimental Test

Keywords

Experimental economics; Rent-dissipation; Rent-seeking; Transfers

Abstract

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers. © Economic Science Association 2007.

Publication Date

3-1-2007

Publication Title

Experimental Economics

Volume

10

Issue

1

Number of Pages

21-36

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1

Socpus ID

34248340112 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/34248340112

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