Title

Attacker Detection Game In Wireless Networks With Channel Uncertainty

Abstract

Identification and isolation of attackers in a distributed system is a challenging problem. This problem is even more aggravated in a wireless network because the unreliable channel makes the actions of the users (nodes) hidden from each other. Therefore, legitimate users can only construct a belief about a potential attacker through monitoring and observation. In this paper, we use game theory to study the interactions between regular and attacker nodes in a wireless network. We model the attacker node detection process as a Bayesian game with imperfect information and show that a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is attainable. Further, we show how an attacker node can construct a nested belief system to predict the belief held by a regular node. By employing the nested belief system, a Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is reached and the equilibrium postpones the detection of the attacker node. Simulation results and their discussions are provided to illustrate the properties of the derived equilibria. ©2010 IEEE.

Publication Date

8-13-2010

Publication Title

IEEE International Conference on Communications

Number of Pages

-

Document Type

Article; Proceedings Paper

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2010.5502667

Socpus ID

77955401005 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/77955401005

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