Title

Managerial Rights, Use Of Investment Banks, And The Wealth Effects For Acquiring Firms' Shareholders

Keywords

Investment banking; Managerial rights; Mergers and acquisitions; Shareholder rights; Wealth effects

Abstract

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms' shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

1-1-2010

Publication Title

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volume

34

Issue

1

Number of Pages

44-54

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.07.002

Socpus ID

70350232029 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/70350232029

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