Title

Continuous-Time Dynamic Games For The Cournot Adjustment Process For Competing Oligopolists

Keywords

Continuous-time dynamic game; Cournot adjustment; Cournot oligopoly; Nonlinear dynamics

Abstract

Under the assumption of an iso-elastic demand function, we consider a continuous-time dynamic Cournot adjustment game for n oligopolists. We first show the existence and uniqueness of a positive Cournot equilibrium and, for any n, we show that positive response functions are bounded in time. For the n = 3 case, we analytically show that the positive equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, while, for n > 3, we are able to give some asymptotic results. As an application, we then introduce a proportional tax or subsidy to the model, and discuss the influence of such policies on the positive equilibrium. Furthermore, we briefly discuss a generalization of the results to non-iso-elastic demand functions. Comments on possible areas of future work are given. © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Publication Date

2-21-2013

Publication Title

Applied Mathematics and Computation

Volume

219

Issue

12

Number of Pages

6400-6409

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2012.12.078

Socpus ID

84873976192 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84873976192

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